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Abstract—The proliferation of IoT devices in smart homes, hospitals, and enterprise networks is widespread and continuing to increase in a
superlinear manner. With this unprecedented growth, how can one assess the security of an IoT network holistically? In this article, we
explore two dimensions of security assessment, using vulnerability information of IoT devices and their underlying components
(compositional security scores) and SIEM logs captured from the communications and operations of such devices in a network (dynamic
activity metrics) to propose the notion of an attack circuit. These measures are used to evaluate the security of IoT devices and the overall
IoT network, demonstrating the effectiveness of attack circuits as practical tools for computing security metrics (exploitability, impact, and risk
to confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of heterogeneous networks. We propose methods for generating attack circuits with input/output
pairs constructed from CVEs using natural language processing (NLP) and with weights computed using standard security scoring
procedures, as well as efficient optimization methods for evaluating attack circuits. Our system provides insight into possible attack paths an
adversary may utilize based on their exploitability, impact, or overall risk. We have performed experiments on IoT networks to demonstrate
the efficacy of the proposed techniques.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, Security and Privacy Protection, Distributed Systems, Risk Management, Graphs and Networks
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1 INTRODUCTION
Statista estimates that the number of connected IoT devices
will rise from 19.4B in 2018 to 34.2B in 2025 [1], and that the
percentage of U.S. homes that are smart will rise from 33.2% in
2019 to 53.9% in 2023 [2]. The usage of Internet of Things (IoT)
devices in networks such as smart homes, smart cities, and
digital healthcare is clearly increasing, and while the adaptable
and heterogeneous features of these networks have proven to
be crucial in solving a vast array of different issues, they have
also given adversaries a veritable sandbox of vulnerabilities to
exploit. Security measures that prevent attackers from exploit-
ing these vulnerabilities are more important now than ever
before because of the growing quantity and sensitivity of data
that people are putting online. The complexity of multi-stage
privacy, service, and system integrity attacks is also growing,
and it is now critical for home owners, enterprises, or govern-
ment organizations that host various IoT devices on complex
IoT networks (augmented by the increasing commonality of
the Bring-Your-Own-Device (BYOD) norm) to be aware of the
cybersecurity risks that may be present. In particular, it is
vital to determine high-priority vulnerabilities that need to be
addressed in order to keep the overall network, as well as the
individual devices, protected.
We propose the use of a flow network for evaluating the
security of an IoT network, which we refer to as an attack
circuit.1 This structure arises naturally from the often modular,
extensible, and heterogeneous nature of IoT networks and
helps to model possible attack paths and evaluate the security
state of the represented IoT network as well as each individual
device therein. An attack circuit is a type of attack graph with
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edges defined by the inputs and outputs of its vertices, just
as an electrical circuit’s nodes map input and output of circuit
elements. The term attack circuit is particularly inspired because
of the heterogeneity of electrical circuit elements and the “plug-
gable” property of having elements added or removed. This
contribution solves problems such as vulnerability documen-
tation processing, delivering different types of metrics in the
form of compositional scoring and network flow analysis and
incorporating network activity data into dynamic activity met-
rics. Current methods, discussed in Section 2, seek to address
these problems for general networks as well as specifically for
IoT networks—our work builds off of these ideas, adding our
own novelties to address some of the limitations of current
work. These novelties solve problems described in Section
3 such as vulnerability documentation processing, delivering
different types of metrics in the form of compositional scoring
and network flow analysis, and incorporating network activity
data into dynamic activity metrics (this is explored further in
Section 4). In Section 5, we discuss the practical and theoretical
usefulness of this notion in the context of a smart home, using
vulnerability data from the National Vulnerability Database
(NVD)2, network traffic data from off-the-shelf IoT devices,
and optimization and machine learning techniques for con-
structing and evaluating the resulting attack circuits and attack
paths. Finally, in Section 6, we demonstrate our own imple-
mentation of the attack circuit and evaluate the effectiveness
of such a notion through quantitative experimentation. This is
followed by concluding remarks in Section 7.
2 RELATED WORK
In computer security, a vulnerability is defined as a weakness
of a system that can be exploited by an attacker. The attacker
may then perform unauthorized activities within the system.
Alternatively, an exposure is a software error in the system that
allows the attacker to gain access to system data and conduct
information gathering activities. The attacker may accompany
this by hiding unauthorized system activity from associated
2. http://nvd.nist.gov/download.cfm
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2monitoring services. Subsequently, the Common Vulnerabili-
ties and Exposures (CVE) system [3] is a built reference for
publicly identified information-security vulnerabilities and ex-
posures. The system is maintained by the Mitre Corporation3.
CVE entries are primarily composed of identifiers, descrip-
tions, references and the date at which the CVE entry was
created. The Mitre Corporation also maintains the Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE) system [4], which categorizes
software weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The combined use
to CVE and CWE allows organizations to select appropriate
software tools for internal usage. Our work uses the CVE
and CWE systems as a standardized source of information to
generate a representation of possible attacks. Additionally, the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [3] provides a
way to capture the principal characteristics of a vulnerability
and produce a numerical score reflecting its severity. We build
on these existing scores to evaluate device and network vul-
nerability.
Work in [5] emphasizes the security risks of smart-home
networks using commercially available smart-home devices
with encrypted communication. The authors explore attacks
by first identifying the device (using Domain Name System
(DNS) queries or device fingerprinting) and then inference of
activities based on changes in network traffic. Network traffic-
based threats are also highlighted in [6], [7], where the authors
demonstrate an attacker that passively observes encrypted
network traffic to infer sensitive details about network users.
Work in [8] examines the security flaws for smart-home
networks with specific interest in the exploitation of the lack
of mechanisms for firmware updates or patches for security
vulnerabilities. The authors propose a system to identify the
types of devices that are connected and suggest the use of
appropriate communication constraints, given that knowledge.
The device type for their work is the enumeration of a specific
device. Work in [8] is, however, limited to the formulation of
a method to identify a given device, and does not provide
a metric to determine how vulnerable a device is. Network
attacks are modeled using attack graphs in [9]. The authors
propose a scalable model zero-day exploits [10] and client-
side attacks [11], [12], in contrast to prior attack graph systems
that focus on server-side vulnerabilities [13], [14]. The work,
however, focuses on modeling such attacks and corresponding
countermeasures, but does not provide a means to quantify
the relative impacts of different attacks. Work in [15] discusses
the provision of security objectives for smart-home networks.
While it does not discuss the underlying detection mechanism
used, the application of security flaw detection is aligned with
the motivation for our work.
Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF)
[16] is a numerical statistic used in information retrieval to
determine the relative importance of words in a document. TF-
IDF and TF and IDF individually may also serve as heuristics
for weighting words. Our work leverages TF-IDF to compute
attack meta-data for a given CVE entry. TextRank [17], [18] is
a graph-based ranking model for text processing. It is inspired
by recursive graph-based ranking algorithms such as HITS [19]
and PageRank [20], using a voting mechanism. While TextRank
may be used for sentence extraction and text summarization,
our work uses the information stored in the intermediate
process: the extraction and ranking of phrases.
3. mitre.org
Threat, Vulnerability, Risk Analysis (TVRA) [21] generates
an integer value of risk based on the attack likelihood for
a given network. However, TVRA encodes threats as trees,
which provides less comprehensive information of interaction
of attacks than methods such as flow networks explored in
our work. While the Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) [22], [23] framework en-
ables risk-based strategy assessment and associated planning
techniques, it requires the training of team members in order to
conduct the complex analysis. Our work is aligned in purpose
with the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [24],
[25] and HEAling Vulnerabilities to ENhance Software Security
and Safety (HEAVENS) [26]. OWASP uses attack vectors to
compute technical and business impacts to a network, produc-
ing a raw score and also an associated integer label describing
attack severity. HEAVENS uses and attack probability table
for threat analysis and risk assessment. Our work differs from
these by using recursive information with network flow in the
compositional score, potentially combined with the use of other
sequential learning techniques in the dynamic activity metrics.
Additionally, attack graph generation tools are proposed
by [27], [28]. However, they are focused on non-IoT networks.
Our work is specific to IoT networks, with NLP assisted graph
generation.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
Given a network of IoT devices and any additional knowledge
about them (e.g., from CVEs or the device specification), the
problem addressed by our work is to compute a security state
triple 〈R,E, I〉 corresponding to the risk triple, exploitability
score, and impact scores for each vulnerability, device, and the
network. Exploitability is a measure of how difficult it would
be for an adversary to compromise the object, and the impact
is a measure of the level of harm or compromise an adversary
could inflict in the case of vulnerability exploitation. Risk is
meant to be interpreted as a holistic measure of the security
state of the CVE, device, or network, which evaluates the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability risks of the object’s
potential vulnerabilities: R = 〈RConf , RInteg, RAvail〉. RConf
measures the impact of a successfully exploited vulnerability
on the confidentiality of information managed by the device
or network. A value of Low for RConf means that there is
a low risk of disclosure of such information to unauthorized
individuals or systems. RInteg measures the impact of a suc-
cessfully exploited vulnerability on the integrity of the system.
For instance, if RInteg has a value of Complete, an unautho-
rized user may be able to easily gain root access to a device
following the exploitation of an associated vulnerability.RAvail
measures the impact of a successfully exploited vulnerability
on the availability of the devices or networked services in-
volved. This may include disk space, bandwidth/latency, and
the uptime of the devices and components involved. Having
a high availability risk would be particularly alarming for
medical IoT networks, where lives depend on device fidelity
and responsiveness.
The problem also incorporates the generation of a repre-
sentation of the scored system for further assessment, includ-
ing identifying possible attack paths that an adversary may
traverse to carry out multi-stage attacks on the network. This
may include network visuals, analysis-ready representations,
lists of likely attack paths with respect to different metrics,
3Fig. 1. System architecture summary.
and flow network problem solutions for downstream score
computation. Such a representation would provide insights
into otherwise very complex and unique IoT networks, and
would give improved information for our security state triple.
Because vulnerabilities often stem from the way a system
is used, the problem additionally incorporates data learned
from the traffic of a particular device and holistic network
behaviors. For instance, anomalous traffic volume can often be
an indication of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, and instances
when a device is suddenly receiving responses from or sending
requests to a blacklisted IP address could factor into our
security state triple. This broadens the scope of our security
state assessment and could provide strategies for real-time
countermeasures against adversaries.
4 PROPOSED METHOD
Our proposal is a sequential computation of the triple
〈R,E, I〉—a method that utilizes preexisting knowledge about
the devices in the network, topology of the network (deter-
mined by the relation between different vulnerabilities and
potential network flow between devices), and dynamic device
activity and network traffic information. An outline of the pro-
posed system architecture is shown in Figure 1. At the practical
level, the attack circuit model we are proposing considers each
of these properties and can provide each of the desired metrics.
An attack circuit is a type of flow network [29], wherein the
flows can be used to evaluate level of risk, exploitability, and
impact of a network, device, and vulnerability. In this section,
we will discuss the nontrivial problem of constructing attack
circuits using preexisting knowledge and inferences about IoT
devices in the network. We will then explore how the network
can then be used to compute compositional scores on each of the
vulnerabilities, which provide an important baseline for giving
a numerical assessment of exploitability, impact, and risk of
the vulnerabilities of the network. Then, we’ll examine the
affect that dynamic network traffic behaviors and properties
have on the security of devices in the network and show
how these dynamic activity metrics can be combined with the
compositional scores for a more holistic look at the security of
the IoT network. Finally, we’ll propose the use of network flow
algorithms that make use of the scores we’ve calculated for
anticipating optimal attack paths, which give a final evaluation
of the risk, exploitability, and impact measures of the network
and its devices.
4.1 Attack Circuits
An attack graph models the ways that a hacker can exploit
vulnerabilities in order to carry out an attack [28]. In this
paper, we have proposed a notion of an attack circuit, which is
especially applicable to IoT network analysis but may also be
used for other applications. An attack circuit is a class of attack
graph with vertices which represent known vulnerabilities
and devices, directed edges which represent the sequential
exploitation possibilities of a multi-stage attack vector, edge
weights which correspond to some desired security metric, and
a method of evaluation that uses flow network methodologies.
This gives us the first important property of attack circuits: they
are metric-agnostic; that is, they can be evaluated with respect to
any metric assigned. Because circuits have inputs and outputs,
it is feasible to determine if two attack circuits can be composed
together to develop a more sophisticated attack circuit. In our
system, we develop an attack circuit per CVE (vulnerability)
and we compose the attack circuits across multiple CVEs for
one or more devices on a network. This reveals the second
important property of attack circuits: they are composable; that
is, one can compose n attack circuits to create a single attack
circuit depending on the input/output pairs described below.
Attack circuits are versatile and also have applications in cloud
cluster computing and other distributed systems that we will
focus on in future work.
4.2 Circuit Construction
The attack circuit is constructed in two stages, described in the
following sections.
4.2.1 Input/Output Extraction
The attack circuits are modeled using text input (vulnerability
descriptions) from a vulnerability database. For each item in
the database, a corresponding input/output pair is generated.
The input corresponds to the attack source and the output
corresponds to the attack target. The process is based on TF-
IDF [16] and TextRank [17], [18] heuristics and is described
next as a series of steps.
All text is primed by conversion to lowercase, removal
of non-alphanumeric characters, tokenization, stemming [30],
[31] and subsequent de-tokenization. TF-IDF is then used on
the processed corpus to produce an ordering of tokens for
each description. TextRank is used on the processed corpus
to produce an ordered list of candidate phrases (with Part-
Of-Speech (POS) tags) that may best represent the description.
The ordered list is filtered to remove noun items (NN). For
each item in the list, tokens are pruned (limited to a maximum
quantity of 3) based on TF-IDF ordering. Stemming is then
removed from tokens by matching them to the corresponding
phrase. The result is stored as input. This extraction process is
then repeated using filtering to remove non-noun items and
the result is stored as output.
44.2.2 Graph Composition
After all of the input/output pairs are created, we have the
information we need to build the attack circuit structure. In our
methodology, an attack circuit is a directed graph isomorphic
to a flow network C = (D,A, S,E) where d ∈ D is a device,
represented as a set of vertices that are the set of vulnerability
database entries corresponding to d; A is the set of attacker
vertices; S is the set of target (or sink, as we’ll see later) vertices
which represent the attack targets in the network; and E is the
set of labeled, directed edges. These edges are weighted with
the associated vulnerabilities’ impact and exploitability base
scores. The attack circuit scheme suffices to provide a logical
approach to determining which attack targets are at risk. We
are also interested in creating variants of the attack circuit that
may give insight to the potential impact, exploitability, and
overall risk an IoT network yields.
4.3 Network Composition Analysis
To take a holistic view of the system, we use several different
security metrics that may each be classified into one of two
larger categories: compositional scoring and dynamic activity
assessment, discussed in the next subsection. Compositional
scoring may be performed by observing the device specifica-
tion, associated vulnerability database information and their
corresponding vulnerability scores, and attack circuit topology.
Our work incorporates the first two items and designates the
third for future work. Compositional scores are derived from
the devices and their role in the network composition, and can
be calculated irrespective of ways they are used over time.
Vulnerabilities are scored using the base risk, exploitability,
and impact subscore method provided by the existing CVSS
v3 standard. After computing the exploitability and impact
subscores for each vulnerability, we can then calculate the
compositional score (c), which is recursively computed using
the impact weights and exploitability capacities of the edges
of the graph. This is summarized in Equation 1 and Equation
2, where Ci is the set of attack circuit input vertices (ci),
where there exists an edge (ci, c), Co is the set of attack circuit
output vertices (co), where there exists an edge (c, co), and
vd is a dampening constant. The impact and exploitability
subscores of each of the device’s vulnerabilities are then used
to determine the impact and exploitability subscores.
cExploitability += vd
∑
ci
ciExploitability (1)
cImpact += vd
∑
co
coImpact (2)
4.4 Network Traffic Analysis
We next examine the dynamic activity metric of a given device
in the network. A large body of work is focused on abnormality
detection and scoring in network traffic patterns [32], [5], [6]. A
vast variety of metrics may be used for results that shed light
onto particular aspects of IoT device and network security.
Our work focuses on ascertaining a small number of these
metrics from packet sniffing on the network of IoT devices
over a period time. The data collected includes device traffic
activity, packet content encryption, and the source/destination
information of the packets.
To illustrate our use of device traffic activity information,
consider the example shown in Figure 2. Devices that are
Fig. 2. An account of device traffic over a period of 12 hours.
online for the majority of the time (i.e. Google Home Mini,
Roku Media Player, HP Printer, and Belkin WeMo) are assigned
larger respective multipliers to their exploitability subscore,
since their connection leaves them more open to attack by an
adversary. The Amazon Echo Dot, in this case, does not have
as significant a multiplier applied to its exploitability subscore,
since it is not online as frequently.
Next, we analyze the percentage of the packets that are
sent from and received by each device and their usage of
secure encryption protocols. We also check whether any source
or destination IP is listed in an IP blacklist database. The
encryption metric is used as a multiplier for the exploitability
subscore, and the blacklisted IP metric is used as a multiplier
for the impact subscore. The calculated compositional scores
and dynamic activity metrics for a device can then be used to
improve security risk scoring and attack path analysis.
4.5 Network Flows and Attack Path Analysis
To anticipate how an adversary might carry out an attack on
the network and to score the network holistically, we apply
a variety of Network Flow Problems [33] [34] to the attack
circuit for evaluating potential attack paths based on impact,
exploitability, and risk. Sources and sinks in the flow network
correspond to attack sources and attack targets, respectively.
4.5.1 Impact Paths
An impact path is the route through the circuit that an attacker
takes to maximize impact, defined by the circuit edge weights.
We specify the attacker nodes as sources, and attacker targets as
sinks. Equation 3 illustrates the Maximum Flow Problem method
used—fuv is the flow between vertices u and v, a is an attacker
vertex, s is a sink (target) vertex. The sum of the impact path
flows of an attack circuit (or the impact score of that circuit) are
equivalent to the sum of the total impact of all easily accessible
attack targets, where the degree of accessibility is defined by
the exploitability of the attack paths leading to it.
maximize
∑
fas subject to
∑
j
fji =
∑
j
fij (3)
4.5.2 Exploitability Paths
An exploitability path is a route from attacker to the attack
target that is associated with a score denoting the resistance
(intuitively, inverse exploitability) of that path. To determine
5the optimal exploitability paths in a circuit, we solve a Min-
imum Cost Flow Problem, where the cost of an edge is its
resistance, or the inverse of the exploitability of that edge
(e.g. (1−Exploitability), if Exploitability ∈ [0, 1]). We use the
same sources and sinks as in Equation 3 now with a cost
cij associated with edge (i, j) and a required flow ras from
attacker to sink (see Equation 4).
minimize
∑
cijfij subject to
∑
fas = ras (4)
After computing the optimal exploitability and impact paths,
the paths themselves may serve as information for network
operators. We may also sum over the exploitability paths in the
network to determine an overall network exploitability score,
which we then combine with the impact score to improve an
overall network security risk score.
4.5.3 Risk Flow Evaluation
Finally, we want to calculate high-risk paths and quantitatively
apply these findings to our risk triple. A risk path is a route
from attacker to target that is optimized for exploitability
constraints, impact weights, and base compositional risk of
the vertices. We combine the strategies used in exploitability
path and impact path analysis here, solving a Minimum Cost
Maximum Flow Problem to identify likely paths through the IoT
network that an adversary might use in an attack. In Equation
5, we outline the network flow problem used to calculate risk,
with the usual cij denoting cost of edge (i, j), a being an
attacker vertex (source), and s being a target vertex (sink):
minimize
∑
cijfij subject to:
maximize
∑
fas subject to
∑
j
fji =
∑
j
fij (5)
Computing risk paths allow us to calculate an improved risk
triple for the network as well as the devices within. The triple
R = 〈RConf , RInteg, RAvail〉 for a device is calculated using
the CVSS v3 metrics for Confidentiality Impact, Integrity Im-
pact, and Availability Impact associated with the CVEs of the
device. Flow through each CVE is multiplied by the respective
impact metric, and the result defines the risk triple R. The
numerical values of the impact metrics may be found in table
8.4 of the CVSS v3 specification document4.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
5.1 Our System
To understand the performance of our proposed method in
common, real-world networks, we modeled our implemen-
tation with off-the-shelf smart home IoT devices, narrowing
our focus to the 34 devices that are common devices and also
have corresponding vulnerabilities listed in the NVD. Live
experiments were run on a network consisting of five of these
devices: an Amazon Echo Dot, a Belkin WeMo, an HP Inkjet
Envy printer, a Google Home Mini, and a Roku digital media
player (see Figure 3).
Circuit construction is implemented using relevant CVEs
in JSON format from the NVD, with text processing using
the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) [35]. An example of the
CVE processed as in Section 4.2.1 is shown in Figure 4. In this
4. https://www.first.org/cvss/specification-document
Fig. 3. The smart-home network traffic graph corresponding to Figure 2.
"Roku Media Player": [{
"description": "The External Control API in
Roku and Roku TV products allow unauthorized
access via a DNS Rebind attack.",
"id": "CVE-2018-11314",
"i/o": ["DNS Rebinding->this:Root
Priv", "DNS Rebinding->this:Config
File"] }]
Fig. 4. An example of a processed CVE data entry.
example, an input (left of the arrow in the i/o field) is an
action (DNS rebinding attack) that the attacker needs to take
to leverage the corresponding vulnerability, in this case, CVE-
2018-11314 (for access to root privileges or the configuration
file). For each input, there is an output (right of the arrow
in the i/o field), which indicates the target that the attacker
receives when once the input is applied to the vulnerability.
A device may have multiple corresponding CVEs, a CVE may
have multiple corresponding inputs, and an input may have
multiple corresponding outputs. NetworkX [36] and SNAP [37]
are then used to build the attack circuit using these input/output
pairs and proceed with scoring.
5.2 Our Scoring Method
Let EBc ∈ [0, 10] denote CVE c’s base exploitability score and
IBc ∈ [0, 10] denote CVE c’s base impact score. We use impact
and exploitability scoring guidelines set by the NVD in their
CVSS v3 method5. The numerical possibilities for the CVSS
metrics AV , AC , PR, UI , IConf , IInteg , and IAvail can be
found in Table 8.4 of the CVSS specification document. Scoring
during the circuit construction phase is computed as shown in
Equation 6.
EBc = 8.22×AV ×AC × PR× UI
ISCBase = 1− [(1− IConf )× (1− IInteg)× (1− IAvail)]
if Scope = unchanged : IBc = 6.42× ISCBase
else : IBc = 7.52× [ISCBase − 0.029]
−3.25× [ISCBase − 0.02]15
(6)
Here, Scope refers to the ability for a vulnerability in one
component or device to impact resources beyond its privileges.
Each CVE contains a Scope field with a value of changed
(if the exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond its
authorized privileges) or unchanged (if the vulnerable com-
ponent is the same as the impacted component).
Now, letECd denote device d’s compositional exploitability
score and ICd denote device d’s compositional impact score.
Let cinputs denote the set of CVEs with input to c (where each
5. http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm
6device d has a set of c corresponding to each CVE), let coutputs
denote the set of CVEs that c has output to, let fij be retreived
by solving the appropriate network flow problem described in
4.5, and let vd denote a dampener variable (we used vd = 0.1).
Scoring during the compositional phase is computed as shown
in Equation 7.
ECd =
∑
c∈d
(EBc + vd
∑
ci∈cinputs
fcicEBi)
ICd =
∑
c∈d
(IBc + vd
∑
co∈coutputs
fccoIBo)
(7)
Next we compute the network traffic multipliers for impact
and exploitability. Network traffic data is collected using
Wireshark [38] and is stored in .pcap format. This file is
then converted to CSV for parsing. The data is specific to a
network of 5 IoT devices and a period of 4 days. We use three
metrics: device Network Uptime (NU ), Encryption Scheme
(EN ), and whether IP sources or destinations were listed in
an IP blacklist database6 (IP ). The weights we assigned to
the different categories correspond to importance with respect
to the score in consideration—for instance, when considering
the exploitability score, the Network Uptime multiplier = NU
= {"always_online": 1.6, "frequently_online":
1.4, "rarely_online": 1.07, "never_online": 1}.
The final exploitability and impact scoresEd, Id for a device
d are then calculated as shown in Equation 8, where mEi is
an exploitability-related network traffic multiplier (e.g. NU ,
EN ), mIj is an impact-related network traffic multiplier (e.g.
IP ), and vn is a normalizing variable (we use vn1 = vn2 =
100). These scores are normalized by some sigmoidal function
defined on the non-negative reals: σ : R≥0 → [0, 1).
Ed = σ(vn1 × ECd ×
∏
i
mEi)
Id = σ(vn2 × ICd ×
∏
j
mIj )
(8)
The overall network exploitability score EN is defined by
the sum of the exploitability scores of its devices, and is accom-
panied with the path of minimum cost to each of the attack tar-
gets. The overall network impact score IN is the solution to the
max-flow problem in the attack circuit after each of the edges
have been weighted based on all of the CVEs’ base impact
scores. Finally, the risk tripleRN = 〈RConf , RInteg, RAvail〉 for
the network is computed using the CVSS v3 metrics associated
with the respective risk triples of the network’s devices. First
we solve the Maximum Flow Minimum Cost Problem in the
attack circuit (see Equation 9).
minimize
∑
EBijfij subject to:
maximize
∑
ICas subject to
∑
j
fji =
∑
j
fij (9)
Once this each fij is computed, the flow through each CVE
is multiplied by the respective impact metric—Confidentiality
Impact (IConfc ), Integrity Impact (IIntegc ), and Availability
Impact (IAvailc ) for vulnerability c given by CVSS v3, as well
as a normalization variable vni , and the result defines the risk
triple Rd for a device d with as set of CVEs cd, each of which
6. https://myip.ms/browse/blacklist
Echo, 1 CVE Echo, all CVEs Echo, WeMo
EEcho 0.0289 0.1182 0.3380
IEcho 0.0140 0.0679 0.1776
Echo RConf 0.0073 0.0341 0.0982
Echo RInteg 0.0 0.0268 0.0910
Echo RAvail 0.0 0.0 0.0644
EWeMo N/A N/A 0.8490
IWeMo N/A N/A 0.4823
WeMo RConf N/A N/A 0.5744
WeMo RInteg N/A N/A 0.5649
WeMo RAvail N/A N/A 0.4605
ENetwork 0.0289 0.1182 0.9223
INetwork 0.0140 0.0679 0.6078
Network RConf 0.0073 0.0341 0.6367
Network RInteg 0.0 0.0268 0.6239
Network RAvail 0.0 0.0 0.5098
TABLE 1
Device and network scores for different network settings.
Fig. 5. Exploitability score adjustment with the addition of new devices
(augmented in sequence (left to right, top to bottom)) and CVEs.
have a set of neighbors cinputs (shown in Equation 10). These
scores are normalized to range [0, 1).
RConf = σ
vn3 ×∑
c∈d
IConfc
 ∑
ci∈cinputs
fcic

RInteg = σ
vn4 ×∑
c∈d
IIntegc
 ∑
ci∈cinputs
fcic

RAvail = σ
vn5 ×∑
c∈d
IAvailc
 ∑
ci∈cinputs
fcic

(10)
6 EVALUATION
We evaluate the attack circuit system using a variety of net-
works and device activity metrics. In our work, we showcase
three of these networks: one consisting of one device (an
Amazon Echo Dot) with one vulnerability (CVE-2018-11567),
one consisting of the Amazon Echo Dot and all of its cor-
responding CVEs, and one consisting of the Amazon Echo
Dot, a Belkin WeMo smart plug, and all of their associated
CVEs. The generated exploitability and impact circuits for each
of the three settings are shown at the back of this paper in
Figures 6, and an exploitability circuit is shown for the two-
device configuration 7. Note that the attack circuit complexity
grows exponentially with respect to the number of devices in
the network, which is visually evident in these figures and is
the reason why we primarily focus on smaller networks to
demonstrate our work. However, we ran a runtime test of
our system on 146 IoT device CVEs (more than most smart
homes would have) and this calculation took less than a second
on a laptop computer. This is not to demonstrate a primary
7Fig. 6. Exploitability (left) and impact (right) circuits corresponding to one
device under the observation of a single vulnerability. For all of the circuits
listed, colors correspond to score: green is the lowest, followed by yellow,
orange, red, and purple being the highest. Black edges do not have an
associated score.
strength of the work, but rather to point to the computational
practicality of the system.
In Table 1, we record the scores of devices and the network
as they were calculated with each of the networks. These
results reflect the dynamic activity metrics that we recorded
in our experimental observation of the devices over a period
of 4 days, and the output values respond accordingly as we
experimentally change the dynamic metrics of the devices (for
instance, in contrast to the 1-CVE, 1-device network yield-
ing an exploitability score of 0.0289 with the Echo’s actual
status of “rarely_online”, we noted that the exploitabil-
ity score rose to 0.0378 when the device was marked as
“frequently_online”). Note that where only one device
is used, the Belkin WeMo scores are N/A because the device
is not present in that network. We select these particular
devices to evaluate and illustrate the change in scores when
two devices of different levels of vulnerability are added to a
network. Based on its three total CVEs, the Amazon Echo’s vul-
nerabilities don’t yield as high of a risk, exploitability, or impact
score of the device. Note that in the first column, we observe a
network with a vulnerability that is of relatively lesser concern
(CVE-2018-11567, with a base exploitability score of 1.8 and
base impact score of 1.4). When more vulnerabilities are added
in, the device’s scores all increase as expected, and the network
score increases in the same way (because in this setting, the
network is defined solely by the device). When the WeMo is
added, several paths between the WeMo’s vulnerabilities and
the Echo’s vulnerabilities are discovered from the I/O mapping
step, which causes each of the Echo’s scores to rise, and the
network’s scores likewise undergo an increase.
This then raises the following question: how can the scores
of networks, which are largely heterogeneous and unique, be
interpreted relativistically? For now, we normalize the score to
a range of [0, 1) using a sigmoidal function. In general, as the
number of devices grows and the vulnerabilities increase, the
score trends will demonstrate a sigmoidal behavior, converging
to 1. In Figure 5, we observe one metric—the exploitability
score—of 5 devices and the overall network, and how it
changes as more devices are added. In particular, we start with
the Amazon Echo with one vulnerability, then add the rest
of the Amazon Echo’s vulnerabilities, then the Belkin WeMo,
Google Home Mini, Roku media player, and finally HP Inkjet
printer in sequence. As expected, the network’s exploitability
score approaches a value of 1 as more devices are added. The
case may be made that this scoring method is too sensitive
(regardless of the fact that these networks are comprised of
devices whose vulnerabilities we know). This may be a result
of the dampener and normalization variable values or lack of
information about attack circuit behavior in practice. We leave
the related refinement of the scoring method to future work.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we address the problem of evaluating the security
of a network. This is done by using attack circuits and associated
compositional scores and dynamic activity metrics. In this manner,
an individual IoT device or network may be analyzed for
its vulnerability to security attacks. Evaluation in Section 6
demonstrates the increased security risks for a growing IoT
network. While our work focuses on using descriptions to
extract input/output pairs, this approach may be extended to
extract multiple pairs per description, as well as using other
available information sources. Activity metrics may be further
developed by using generative machine learning models to
learn abnormal network traffic behaviors. We also noted that
as networks grow, their complexity grows exponentially. Thus,
the network flow problems may become inefficient with huge
IoT attack circuits, and other approaches such as graph neural
networks may be required for analysis. However, for applica-
tion in smaller IoT networks (e.g. smart homes), we conclude
that this approach suffices. Further, the concept of an attack
circuit is widely adaptable and may be tailored to specific use-
cases in IoT networks and beyond.
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